Division within the Iraqi Yazidi Community
This is my final paper for MES 12.02 Modern Iraq: Society, Politics, and Literature with Professor Hussein Kadhim:
The ISIL takeover of large parts of northern Iraq in August 2014 commenced a genocide of thousands of Yazidis, members of an ethno-religious minority of less than a million in total population. This only adds to the Yazidis’ history of being a targeted people, possessing spiritual beliefs that differ from the majority of those residing in their region of Kurdistan–who identify as Sunni Muslim. Despite having seats in Iraqi parliament, these are generally few in number relative to their population size, leaving Yazidi citizens with the choice of whom to express support for; on one hand, existing Yazidi political parties have struggled to get legislature passed due to their youth (wrt. year of founding); on the other hand, well-established Kurdish political parties desire the support of minorities such as the Yazidis, at times succeeding by being merely the only viable means of protection, rather than ideally serving the needs of the minority, as they often promise to. What receives less attention is how the Yazidis are a divided people, influenced by, at least within the scope of our immediate discussion, one’s interpretation of identity amidst movements particularly promoting Kurdish and Arab nationalism. In this paper, I hope to demonstrate that the divisions within the Iraqi Yazidi community reflect to a certain extent their divergent political allegiances, rather than underlying religious-cultural differences.
I
As context to the divisions within the Yazidi community, we first address their spiritual beliefs. Yazidism is a fundamentally monotheistic religion with elements of syncretism, ie. the beliefs of one religion fusing with those of other religions to create a distinctive tradition. Interestingly, Keith Ferdinando defines syncretism as the substitution or modification of the central elements of a religion by beliefs or practices introduced from elsewhere, which consequently can lead to a fatal compromise of the original religion’s integrity (Ferdinando 272). Yet, it is worth noting that should this definition of syncretism be associated with Yazidism, it may also need describe the Abrahamic religions that inspire Yazidism–Christianity and Islam–both of which recognize select teachings of their ‘original religion(s)’. Namely, Christians accept Yahweh as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, believed by Jews to be the one true God, as discussed in the Old Testament, ie. Hebrew Bible. Moreover, Muslims believe in Adam and Eve’s disobedience to God by eating the forbidden fruit of Eden, as described in the Book of Genesis, the first book of the Hebrew Bible. Although followers of Yazidism have been persecuted as devil worshipers by ISIL–as well as members of Christian/Muslim communities–due to their supposedly deviant beliefs, elements inspiring a faith have historically often been retrospective.
Having assumed the legitimacy of Yazidism in relation to other monotheistic faiths being practiced in the same region, we observe that Yazidis accept many of the same religious beliefs across their people. One such consistent belief is the existence of a single, omnipotent God, referred to in the Kurdish language as Xwedê. The description of Xwedê, as documented in the accumulated religious text named Kitab Al-Jilwah, mentions in Chapter 1 the eternality of God, His dominion over all creations and their worldly affairs, and His assurance to help all those who trust Him and call upon Him (Joseph and Browne 30). Although the Kitab Al-Jilwah was originally written by non-Yazidis–due to the Yazidis’ emphasis on oral tradition and lack of substantial written scripture–it is nonetheless believed to be based on authentic Yazidi narrations (Allison YAZIDIS i. GENERAL). Observe that the transmission of religious beliefs by word of mouth is performed almost exclusively through Kurmanji, a dialect of Kurdish language spoken mainly in southeast Turkey, and parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Caucasus; this merely initiates our discussion regarding the intersection between Yazidi and Kurdish identities. A final example of practices generally accepted by Yazidi communities is intermarriage, limiting contact with non-Yazidi blood and consequently making it difficult for their population to grow from their minority status.
Beyond the numerous religious beliefs and practices accepted across the Yazidi people, we introduce a significant point of contention, that is, the classification of Yazidis as a member of the Kurdish people. Despite sharing a common dialect of language, ie. Kurmanji, both the Yazidi and Kurdish communities remain divided regarding whether the former are ethnically Kurds or comprise a distinct ethnic group (UNHCR 76). Yazidis reside across parts of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, only about ten percent of whom live in definitively Kurdish-ruled regions; lands that the remaining majority of Yazidis reside in are disputed–namely, the Iraqi provinces of Sinjar and Sheikhan–as they are desired to be incorporated by Kurdish authorities into the region of Kurdistan in the future. This may explain strategic interests for the Kurdish government, and consequently its Kurdish supporters, in harnessing Yazidi identity as a means to facilitate expansion of territory. What founds Yazidi acceptance or rejection of Kurdish identity may potentially hinge upon differences in spiritual beliefs. Those in favor of a distinguished Yazidi identity may cite the uniqueness of their mythology, eg. the belief that they are the children of Adam but not of Eve (Allison The Yezidi Oral Tradition in Iraqi Kurdistan 40); other Yazidis may claim the undeniable truth of Yazidi faith, and rebuking the deviance of Kurds who converted to Islam and lost the pre-Islamic rituals they had once performed (Abrahamian 116). Note, however, that not all Yazidis necessarily take the mentioned spiritual beliefs as far as to justify the severing of ties with Kurdish identity. This may prompt concern for the types of divisions that have formed within the Yazidi community, particularly over the modern era; are such divisions related to differences regarding foundational religious principles described thus far, other motives, or a combination of both?
II
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on Yazidis residing in what we consider to be Modern Iraq. In this region, politics and societal upheaval have shaped the representation of religious minorities at least since the establishment of the Kingdom of Iraq in 1921, following the 1920 Iraqi revolt against the Mandate for Mesopotamia determined by the League of Nations. Since then, numerous regimes that have claimed secular ideologies have come to power and eventually been ousted via war and coups; these are effectively setbacks to the dream of a perhaps one-day secular Iraq, impacting religious minority groups such as Yazidis. One such example may be the regime of Saddam Hussein, who entered as an authoritarian Arab nationalist, despised by Islamists and a potential force for a secular pan-Arabist movement. He ultimately was persistent on maintaining his power, and with the Ba’athist party, desired to incorporate Islam into their political ideologies, attempting to carefully use Islam as a unifying force, though not as so far as empowering sectarian and Islamist groups (Helfont). In the 1980s, Hussein’s Ba’athist regime led Arabization campaigns in parts of Northern Iraq that targeted namely Kurds and Yazidis by displacing them from their villages in the Sheikhan and Sinjar provinces, a means of exerting Arab domination in the region, an act that has been deemed an example of internal colonialism (Basu 103). In 1993, Hussein would promote the Return to Faith Campaign as a means to maintain power in his nation, a state in chaos having conducted failed wars, killings of thousands of citizens, and ruined relations with once ally United States. He effectively attempted to embrace Islamist ideals in order to debase the defining ideology of enemies aspiring to oust him. As a result, a climate of intolerance ensued in Iraq towards those labeled as heretics in the eyes of Sunni Muslims; while this was overwhelmingly oppressive towards Shia Muslims, it created a reason for people practicing faith in general to maintain a sense of religious identity, furthering the need for belonging in Iraqi society.
A factor as to Yazidi division stems from the distribution of the Kurdish population across Iraqi and Kurdish lands, which are controlled by the Central Government of Iraq (CGI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), respectively, as imposed by the United Nations Security Council upon ending of the Second Gulf War in 1991. Though this allowed the creation of a ‘safe zone’ for Kurds in Northern Iraq, repercussions to this policy include the ill acknowledgement of the safe zone by the Hussein regime (Haspeslagh 1), evinced by his regime’s 1996 missile strike on the Kurdish city of Erbil in lieu of the Kurdish Civil War. Another repercussion is the displacing of Yazidi tribes, and the resulting fracturing of their political representation; Yazidis residing in CGI lands were unable to convene due to the Ba’ath Party’s pervasiveness, whereas Yazidis in KRI lands were largely frowned upon from creating their own party by prominent existing parties, namely the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), both of whom possess largely nationalist ideologies that, as we will later address, viewed Yazidis to be similar enough to Muslim Kurds to warrant being represented by Kurdish agendas; this may help base their desires for ultimately assimilating the Yazidis into Kurdish society.
We elaborate on the representation of Yazidis specifically within the KRG, particularly with respect to the policies of the primary political party and its main opponent: the KDP and PUK, respectively. Representation in KRG parliament for Armenian, Christian, and Turkmen minorities has been minimal at best, given that as of October 2017 merely 11 of 111 seats were reserved for these groups, none of which were given namely for Yazidis (Zoonen and Wirya 11). For the interests of the common Yazidi to be vouched for in parliament, one approach has been to demonstrate support for one of the mentioned prominent Kurdish political parties, which though may have their own political agendas in focus and may not sincerely stand for the needs of the ethnic Yazidi community, do perhaps offer a hope for acknowledgement amongst minority populations. A second approach has been the formation of Yazidi movements and political parties, though these have historically earned minimal shares of the popular vote during elections. The scarceness of positioned leaders who actively listen to the common Yazidi people fuels a need for Yazidi voters to make challenging and potentially critical choices as to their political allegiances; emerging from this is concern for potential reasons that a particular Yazidi may consider when deciding between ideologies of parties or political movements.
Recognizing the pressures dealt upon minority religions amidst the rise of Arab and Kurdish nationalism in the 1960s, we consider the origins of Yazidi-Arab and Yazidi-Kurdish ethno-nationalist identities. Though an association between the Arabs and Yazidis may lie in the term ‘Yazidi’ itself, supposedly referring to the Umayyad Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiya according to certain Western scholars (Allison YAZIDIS i. GENERAL), this is often rejected by Yazidis, partly because he is said to have lived in the more recent time period compared to the more ancient Yazidi religion (Suvari 32). Before judging the extent of “Arab-ness” of an ethnic group to assign an identity, recognize that the nationalist and sectarian agendas of the majority groups in Iraq–namely Sunni Arab, Shi’a Arab, and Sunni Kurd–have historically made religion take on a greater role in Iraqi politics, helping partly explain this relatively recent desire for associating Arab/Kurdish-ness to Yazidis. The affiliation of religious minorities to the central authority has been incentivized through promises by parties for religious secularism and/or leftism, which has led minorities to somewhat deviate from their rooted core identities since around the 1960s (Ali “Aspirations for Ethnonationalist Identities”); this may suggest that contentiousness amongst Yazidis regarding the need for to have their own distinct identity could be partly politically motivated. Events of the ’60s that would have motivated such a turn would include the First Iraqi-Kurdish War from 1961-70, which was initiated by Kurdish forces, led by KDP head Mustafa Barzani, against pro-government Iraqi forces, led by Abdul Karim Qasim, who instigated the conflict by denying a promise to grant Kurds regional autonomy in return for support of his policies. Meanwhile, the intention of “saving Arabism” is said to have influenced the newly proclaimed Syria Arab Republic in joining the war against Kurds in 1961, with the intention of alienating 120,000 Kurds in the Syria’s Jazira province, deeming them to be illegally infiltrated foreigners (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 151). This particular situation–albeit beyond the scope of Modern Iraq, yet remains relevant–is elaborated upon by the respected non-communist Arab author Mussali, who claims that although Kurds had comprised some of the best of Syrian citizens, their emigration into Northern Syria in large numbers was coordinated and strategic, prompting countermeasures by the frightened Syrian-Arab population (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 152). From this conflict, we observe certain motivations for Kurdish nationalism, emboldened by a history of promises not being kept as defined in policy (eg. Kurdish ethnic identity being defined in 1921 Provisional Iraqi Constitution, Kurdish rights being promised in 1932 Local Languages Law, declared partnership between Kurds and Arabs in Iraqi Constitution of 1960). However, the furthering of Kurdish nationalism appears to be seen as a potential threat to Arab nationalism. Of concern is how the overbearing dichotomous choice of siding with either Arab ethnonationalist and Kurdish ethnonationalist identities manifested among minorities like the Yazidis, whose citizens are evidently driven by loyalty to their tribal customs and spiritual leaders.
One means for Iraqi religious minorities to engage in political activity has been via support for the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) (or for its later offshoot, the Kurdistan Communist Party (KCP)), whose underlying Marxist-Leninist ideology and expressed emphasis on religious secularism make it appealing to lower and middle classes of underrepresented minorities. The ICP gives particular attention to addressing social concerns, including workers’, women’s, and class rights, whilst remaining one of the only truly trans-religious and trans-ethnic parties in Iraq (Jabbar). On paper, it seems to promote a sense of Iraqi identity catering to the variety of ethnic groups existing in the nation, rather than necessarily the dominant ethnic groups. Examples of such are its consistent affirmations in favor of an independent Kurdish State, as demonstrated by its support for the Kurdish Revolt, as well as its entrusting by Iraqi parliament to lead certain efforts requiring the impartiality between clashing ethnicities, eg. the Issue of Kirkuk (Jabbar). Based on its performance, it seems the ICP would offer a viable alternative to the rising concepts of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, satisfying the desires of Yazidis who may fear that such nationalist movements may lead to the furthering of persecution.
On the other hand, religious minorities have also expressed support for the KDP, despite having been extensively criticized due to recent policies, particularly among Yazidis. Observe that a reason why the KDP today still exerts influence upon minorities–namely Assyrians, Christians, and Yazidis–is due to said minority populations’ partial involvement in the Kurdish Revolt, occurring due to the strategy of Kurdish politicians to negotiate with minorities and garner support for the referendum (Benjamen). This raises concern over why Yazidis from their perspective would agree to support the KDP, given that some Yazidis would perceive the Kurds to be enemies to their own self-determination. This may be explained by the minorities’ displeasure with whom the Kurds oppose, the Iraqi government. The Iraqi government namely did not condemn past violence of Arab nationalists–eg. during the Mosul Uprising in 1959 in opposition to Qasim’s Communist Party-backed regime. Furthermore, the mentioned minority groups were effectively forced to pick a party to side with; numerous battles between the Kurdish Movement and Iraqi government were taking place on lands home to minorities, due to the preciousness of Kurdistan’s oil-rich lands. Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish Movement, would gather allegiances from tribes by launching a political campaign, requesting their cooperation or otherwise the subsequent taking of their weapons. Considering how this cornered the Assyrian minority residing north of Mosul, who despite desiring freedom and self-governance feared both the Iraqi regime and the Kurds (Donabed 143), we find this to be a source of division for the similarly positioned Yazidi community, who too were faced with this choice of allegiance.
The non-committal of the KDP towards minority groups is demonstrated by the Party’s later apparent abandonment of Assyrian and Yazidi populations threatened by the August 2014 ISIL invasion. This involved the withdrawal of KDP and PUK-led Peshmerga armed forces from the province of Sinjar, apparently leaving without proper warning to the residing local population, an act that KRG president and KDP leader Masoud Barzani blamed to be a unilateral decision by his political rivals (Morris). Accusations over why the withdrawal was made range from an act of disservice to Yazidis, stemming from the continued spite between Yazidis and Kurds, to the mere negligence of certain Peshmerga officers in carrying out their duty, although evidence has yet to be uncovered from ongoing investigations. In November 2014, PKK and YPG (People’s Protection Units) would lead aids to free Sinjar, which although may imply differences in KDP and PUK view upon Yazidis, could potentially be just a strategic move by the PKK to usurp control of parts of Sinjar to make themselves relevant. Though some Yazidis were indeed freed due to the PKK advances on the Sinjar Mountains–notably yielding the formation of Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS), a faction of PKK forces with Iraqi and Syrian Yazidis–leading parts of the Yazidi community to praise their assistance, the vast majority of Yazidis still would not return home due to the PKK’s presence until spring 2018 (Yarar). The thus-far described situation of the Yazidis inspires discussion of why creation of a distinct Yazidi identity may offer a fresh hope, perhaps avoiding having to ascribe to the promises of existing parties.
III
Growing desires for a Yazidi ethno-nationalist identity notably gave way to an independent political movement called the Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress (popularly called ISLAH), founded post-2003 following the United States’ occupation of Iraq; together with the Yazidi Democratic Party, Yazidi Freedom and Democracy Party, and Yazidi Progress Party, they comprise the Yazidi Coalition, a group focused on (1) establishing new administrations in the ailing Sinjar and Qahtaniya districts, (2) forming a Yazidi military force of both existing Yazidi forces in Sinjar and Yazidi civilians, (3) participating jointly in elections (BBC Monitoring). Though these actions seem to be arguably necessary responses to the modern issues concerning Yazidis, supporting literature attempting to provide justification for Yazidi nationalism had too been published by Ameen Farhan Jejo, one of the founders of ISLAH. However, due to the lack of substantial historical evidence dating the existence of Yazidis to ancient Iraq and linking similarities between Yazidi and ancient Iraqi languages, this evidence turned out to be insufficient for legally justifying Yazidi as a nationality in parliament, particularly due to Yazidi members in parliament claiming Yazidis to be of Kurdish nationality, according to then MP Vian Dakhil (Ali “The identity controversy”). Despite the presence of Yazidi political parties, reasons for this discord among the Yazidi community may lie in the scattered influence of ISLAH across Iraq; a major hub is the Sinjar region, but a major weak point is the Walati region. A key issue that bases the variety in party affiliation is unsurprisingly a given party’s view regarding whether Yazidis are ethnically Kurdish, revealing that this dilemma indeed exists within the Yazidi community, ie. the dispute is far from being settled upon. This inspires the ongoing competition to dominate Yazidi areas. For context as to the diversity in Yazidi political agendas, beyond ISLAH, there exist two notable organizations named the Yazidi Democratic Gathering and The Free Yazidi Democratic Movement (TEVDA); the former distinguishes itself by being a more relaxed initiative, emphasizing “modesty of thought” whilst, unlike ISLAH, adopting no nationalistic ideology; the latter strives to produce fully independent Yazidi policy (Salloum 18-9). Despite the existence of parties claimed to be dedicated to the betterment of Yazidis, being that they are minority parties, a lack of strong coordination and alliance with larger political parties will hinder their ability to pass legislature. Unfortunately, given the sensitivity of topics concerning the Yazidis, cooperation with non-Yazidi parties has, and will continue to be, challenging in terms of retaining parliamentary seats; this helps ground the ongoing situation of Yazidi citizens’ divergent political allegiances, who will inevitably disagree upon whom to express support for in government.
Reasons for the existence of cliques of political thought among Yazidis can largely be attributed to external forces impacting the community, as opposed to potential religious-cultural differences that may be causing internal disputes. For instance, if we return to our discussion of the Second Gulf War of 1991, observe that prior to 1991, the social structure of Yazidis was relatively united due to its being represented by the Emiri Institution, headed by then Prince Tahseen Bek and the Yazidi Supreme Spiritual Council (Salloum 17). Following the war and the United Nations Security Council’s imposition of a safe zone, observe that this allowed Kurdish parties to gain control of new territories from the Iraqi government, including provinces such as Dohuk, home to four major concentrated Yazidi populations. The distribution of lands between the KRG and Iraqi government would expectedly divide the Yazidi community, making each of its ‘sectors’ influenced by distinct political ideologies and their respective propaganda.
Conclusion
Apparent from this discussion are some of the influences perhaps beyond the Iraqi Yazidis community’s locus of control that have, and may continue to, prevent them from receiving the aid necessary to escape persecution; the approaches on how to proceed as a community to make their voices heard evidently divide them today. Yazidis practice a monotheistic religion with syncretic elements, and unlike Islam, there are few divisions and sects would be inspired by differences in the interpretation of their oral traditions. The extent of their affiliation with Kurdish culture, ie. whether or not to identity as being ethnically Kurdish, was hypothesized to be a differentiating factor as for allegiances in the Yazidi community, due to it being a relevant issue to identity politics in the Kurdistan region. By examining societal movements in Modern Iraq since the 1920s, we initially observed that the aspirations for religious secularism in Iraq, though promised by certain regimes, failed to manifest and instead gave way to spells of religious intolerance. Kurdistan, home to the majority of Iraqi Yazidis, saw the displacement of many of its minority populations as consequences of the Second Gulf War and Kurdish Civil War, as well as the dominance of parties such as the KDP. With the rise of Arab and Kurdish nationalist movements having guided uprisings such as the Kurdish Civil War, it inspired this need for Yazidis to have to associate with whichever existing ideology was least harmful to them, as opposed one of their own creation. Political allegiances of Yazidis to prominent parties has arguably been situational and weakly, if at all, been dictated by a given party's catering to a certain Yazidi belief system; although there indeed exists vocal Yazidis supporters in favor of the KDP, one may point to the KDP simply being an entity opposed to the problematic Iraqi government, as well as their apparent inaction towards protecting the Yazidis from ISIL invasion, as criticisms of their actual outlook upon minority populations. Motivated in more recent years is the pursuit for a Yazidi ethno-nationalist identity via formation of Yazidi political parties. However, it appears that regardless of the degree of nationalism desired for by such a party, it is this turbulent history of Modern Iraq that has fortified parliament from seeing progressive policies be passed in favor of Yazidis for the immediate future. It does not help that the Yazidi community has itself been scattered, largely as a result of violent conflicts that they have fallen in the crossfire of.
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